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was binding upon her it must be shown that her interests were in good faith
represented in the proceedings. The interests of the present appellant and
of George A. Evans were identical. Both were members of a class to whom
an individual remainder in fee simple was given. In accordance with the
doctrine of "virtual representation," unborn remaindermen may be bound
by a judgment when the remaindermen in esse are made parties. Coquillard
v. Coquillard,62 Ind. App. 489, 15 R. C. L. 1025.
There are two principles advanced as the basis for such a rule. It is at
once apparent that if the remaindermen have identical interests the same
issues will be raised by the one as the other and if it is impossible for both
to be made parties to an action one of the remaindermen can be depended
upon to bring forward the entire merits of the controversy as a protection
to his own interests. The other reason advanced as making the application
of the doctrine desirable is one of necessity and expediency. Cases arise in
which, if it be held necessary to bring before the court every person having
a present or future interest in the property, the suit could never be brought
to a conclusion or at least a resulting inequitable delay would prevent the
adjustment of present rights because of the contingency of an interested
party, not yet in being. Kent v. Church of St. Michael, 18 L. R. A. 331.
The courts in Indiana have previously decided the immediate point under
consideration (Coquillard v. Coquillard, supra) and a review of the other
authorities supports the Appellate Court in its decision. Wayne v. Bunnley,
227 S. W. 996; Doroney v. Sub, 185 N. Y. 427; and note 8 L. R. A. (n. s.)
49; Mathew v. Lightner, 85 Minn. 333.
The doctrine of "virtual representation" will not be applied when fraud
or collusion is alleged and proved but in this case there was no such allegation so that for the purpose of appeal, the absence of fraud is admitted
and need not be considered as an issue in the case.
It appears from the discussion that the appellant was attempting a suit
upon the same issues and between the same parties (or those in privety
therewith) as that already decided in a former proceeding wherein the appellant was represented and bound by the judgment. Such an action involves the doctrine of res judicata and was correctly decided below on that
basis. The decision of the Supreme Court, however, perpetuates the error
H. W. S.
of Fletcherv. Fletcher.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURY ARISING OUT OF AND IN TEE COURSE
OF EMPLOYMENT-AccIDENT-One, Brewer worked for twelve to fourteen
years on the same job in a brick factory. There was always a considerable
amount of gas and smoke in the air as was necessitated by the brick kilns.
Brewer on Monday, April 14, 1930, became sick from the gas and smoke,
which were always clearly visible and known to Brewer. But he continued
to work until the following Friday when he became so overcome that he had
to quit work. Brewer claimed compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, but it was denied him by the Industrial Board on the ground
that his injury did not arise by "accident." Held, affirmed. Brewer v.
Veedersburg Paving Co., Appellate Court of Indiana, June 25, 1931, 177
N. E. 74.
Raymond Bertels works for seven years handling heated metal sheets
in a steel mill. The place of working was necessarily extremely warm and
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on June 13, 1928, the atmosphere became unusually warm, Bertels became
suddenly exhausted and was seized with cramping of his limbs, which affected his whole body and he was compelled to cease work. Medical aid was
given him but within a few hours he died. Plaintiffs, his dependent mother
and sister, claimed compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act
and the Industrial Board granted it to them on grounds that death was
caused by "accident" arising out of and in the course of employment. Held,
affirmed. Chapman Price Steel Co. v. Bertels, Appellate Court of Indiana,
July 1, 1931, 177 N. E. 76.
In both cases the injured employee sought to recover compensation for
an injury, the decease, caused by "accident" arising out of and in the
course of the employment. "Accident" was defined as "any mishap or untoward event not expected or designed." By this definition it is not the
injury, the disease, that must be surprising, but the event which brought
on the disease. The injury is not something that proceeded directly from
the employment but is a consequence of the "accident." Becoming overheated while handling heated sheets of metal in a steel mill is an "accident"
according to one of these cases. Becoming suffocated and sick from the
inhalation of, vapor and gas while working near a brick kiln is not an "accident" by the other case. The distinction between these two cases, as to why
one would be classed as an "accident" under the above definition and the
other not, is difficult to understand. The heated atmosphere of the steel
mill was as inevitable as the smoke and the gas-laden air of the brick factory. The fact that the symptoms of the consequential disease from the one
is cramping of the limbs and the other suffocation is of no importance. It
is not shown that one had more knowledge of his work or had more reason
to believe that he was more reasonably safe from the injury than the other.
The conditions of both men were practically the same in their respective
employments.
A repeated holding by the Indiana Courts has been that a liberal construction in favor of the employee should be given to the Workmen's Compensation Act, in order that its humane purpose may be realized. Wasmuth
Endicott Co. v. Karst, 77 Ind. App. 279. It should be liberally construed to
the end that the purpose of the legislature, by suppressing the mischiefs
and advancing the remedy, be promoted, even to the inclusion of cases within the reason, although outside the letter of the statute. In re Duncan, 73
Ind. App. 270; In re Bowers, 65 Ind. App. 128; Dewery v. State of Indiana,
84 Ind. App. 37. The purpose as expressed in these cases has been followed by the Indiana Courts in several cases with facts very similar to the
two cases in question. It is believed that a liberal construction of the term
"accident" would avoid the anomalous results and fine distinctions of the
instant cases, and that such liberal construction is warranted from the
authorities available. A case in which the facts were really stronger than
the facts in the Brewer case and compensation was awarded was one in
which the deceased was employed to paint the inside of tank cars. Everyone that was connected with the work, including the deceased, knew that the
work was dangerous because of the poisonous fumes of the paint being so
closely confined in the tank car. Deceased went in the tank to paint without
a respirator, which was against the factory rules. He was dead in eight to
ten minutes. General American Tank Car Corp. v. Berchardt, 69 Ind. App.
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580. Here the danger of suffocation was many times more perceptible than
in a brick factory and deceased was acting against orders by working without a respirator, yet compensation was awarded. Another case where one
was suffocated and was killed thereby was one in which the deceased
breathed the fumes and gases arising from molten brass. His dependents
were awarded compensation. These facts are similar to the case in question. General, etc., Tank Car Corp. v. Weirick, 77 Ind. App. 242. A third
case was one in which a coal miner, who was afflicted with chronic heart
disease, breathed smoke-laden air in a mine and died as a result soon after.
Utilities Coal Co. v. Herr, 76 Ind. App. 312. These cases clearly show the
trend in the past of the Indiana Courts in construing the Workmen's Compensation Act. It has been gratifyingly liberal.
The case in which compensation was denied (Moore v. Service Motor
Truck Co., 80 Ind. App. 668) and the one on which the Brewer case was
decided, was one in which the employee became sick from breathing and
swallowing emery dust created by his work, knowing it had affected others
the same way. The court denied compensation on the grounds that the employee was aware of the evil effects of emery dust upon his health and had
reason to anticipate that more serious consequences would follow. This
tends to classify this injury as an occupational disease and therefore not
compensable in Indiana. Such a conclusion is open to doubt. A carpenter
working on his knees for several days developed bursities or "housemaid's
knee," and such injury was held to be from "accident" and entitled to compensation. The court said, "But, we need not consider whether such disease is or is not an occupational disease, for if it is conceded that it is in the
nature of such, compensation may nevertheless be allowed, if it is contracted
under such conditions as to constitute an accidental injury." Standard Cabinet Co. v. Landgrave, 76 Ind. App. 593. It would seem that there are
enough cases decided by the Indiana Courts under the statute to throw
serious doubt upon the soundness of the dogma that an "accident" within
the meaning of the statute, must be some unforeseen, unusual, or surprising
event arising out of the employment. It would be highly desirable if there
were some more accurate and more workable test than one which will leave
out of account so large a number of cases, and will permit such dubious
results as the two instant decisions.
J. D. W.

